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Abstract
This paper argues that the fundamental principle of contemporary financial economics
is balanced reciprocity, not the principle of utility maximisation that is important in
economics more generally. The argument is developed by analysing the mathematical
Fundamental Theory of Asset Pricing with reference to the emergence of mathemati-
cal probability in the seventeenth century in the context of the ethical assessment of
commercial contracts. This analysis is undertaken within a framework of Pragmatic
philosophy and Virtue Ethics. The purpose of the paper is to mitigate future financial
crises by reorienting financial economics to emphasise the objectives of market stability
and social cohesion rather than individual utility maximisation.
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1 Introduction
The processes of structured finance employing ‘special purpose vehicles/structured investment
vehicles’ (SPVs / SIVs) to fund activities, whether by industrial corporations, like Enron; gov-
ernments, such as the UK government’s Private Finance Initiative; or banks, through asset
backed securities, has had a significant impact on modern business practice. However, along
side its growth, structured finance has become associated with financial crises, particularly the
Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (Caprio et al. [2008], Bernanke [2010], Acharya and Richardson
[2011]). Recurring themes associate the Crisis with financial innovation generating complex
risks (e.g. [Davidson, 2008, p 55], [Crotty, 2009, p 564], [Lawson, 2009, p 769], [Turner, 2009,
p 14]) and the inability of the mathematical techniques employed by financial economics to ad-
dress these issues (e.g. Bouchaud [2008], Davidson [2008], Crotty [2009], [Turner, 2009, p 14],
Lawson [2009], Colander et al. [2011], Haldane and May [2011], Ehret [2013]). Amongst those
who identify a problem with mathematics, there are two classes: those who can see a possi-
ble solution in mathematics (e.g. Bouchaud [2008], Colander et al. [2011], Haldane and May
[2011]) and those who don’t and advocate tighter market regulation (e.g. Davidson [2008],
Crotty [2009], Lawson [2009], Turner [2009]).
While SPVs are frequently presented as twentieth century innovations, their fundamental
character of transforming an uncertain future cashflow into a fixed and insured cashflow was
exhibited in the Contractus Trinus (the ‘triple’ or ‘German’ contract). Noonan [1957, Ch 10]
and Decock [2012] have given detailed accounts of the contract and the scholastic debate about
their legitimacy which eventually led to their condemnation of usury in 1586 (Detestabilia
avaritia). Securitisation and collateralisation manifested themselves as the corpo/sopracorpo
structures that emerged in the thirteenth century (e.g. Palmer [1977, p 554]) and the trading
of securitised assets has been widespread since the eighteenth century, particularly through
the reinsurance markets (e.g. Levy [2012, p 38]).
Mathematics is frequently presented as being an alien encroaching into economics (e.g.
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Weintraub [2002]). However the foundation of European mathematics is in Fibonacci’s 1202
Liber Abaci, a text for merchants [Sigler, 2002], and the subsequent mathematisation of the
physical sciences was stimulated by the mathematical analysis of financial phenomena (e.g.
Hadden [1994], Kaye [1998]). The emergence of mathematical probability, at the heart of
all science, is out of the ethical analysis of commercial contracts (e.g. Franklin [2001], Sylla
[2003], Bellhouse [2005], Sylla [2006]). Rather than mathematics encroaching on economics,
the historical account suggests that economics has generated mathematics that is then used
in other domains. The issues that many of the critics of the contemporary use of mathemat-
ics in economics raise are not relevant to mathematics, as conducted throughout history, but
to modern mathematics. The nature of mathematics has changed in the twentieth century;
pre-modern mathematics developed in the vernacular of financial practice and between the
eighteenth and twentieth centuries was motivated by observation of natural phenomena. In
the second half of twentieth century a theoretical, formalist-deductivist, approach dominated
mathematics, and this was adopted by orthodox economics. While this approach to math-
ematics has been rejected in the physical sciences [Gell-Mann, 1992] it seems to persist in
economics (e.g. Weintraub [2002], Lawson [2012, Ch 10]).
This sketch suggests that while financial technology has not changed significantly over
the centuries, attitudes to mathematical practice have. Mathematical approaches to financial
problems before the nineteenth century were explicitly ethical. Authoritative assessments of
the causes of The Crisis that have looked beyond the field of economics have focussed on
the ethical nature of the financial failures. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC)
concluded that in the lead up to The Crisis there had been a “systemic breakdown in account-
ability and ethics” [FCIC, 2011]. The UK’s Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards
[PCBS, 2013] pointedly titled their comprehensive report of 2013 “Changing Banking for
Good”, emphasising that the direction of change should be in an explicitly moral direction.
The argument in both reports is that improving ethical behaviour is a key component of im-
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proving financial stability. The role of mathematics is peripheral but significant in that it
legitimised financial innovation by creating a false sense of confidence (e.g. FCIC [2011, p 44],
PCBS [2013, vol. 2, para. 60]): mathematics speaks with an indubitable authority that need
not be questioned [Lawson, 2012, Ch 10].
In light of these observations the purpose of this paper to investigate links between contem-
porary financial economics and ethics in order to make a contribution to mitigating financial
crises. This theme has been addressed by a variety of authors, for example, Kevin Jack-
son [Jackson, 2010] tackles it tangentially by addressing failures in the curricula of Business
Schools, an issued examined in detail by Jason West [West, 2012]. Pre-dating the events of
2007, James Horrigan, George Frankfurter and Elton McGoun have examined the underlying
ideology of financial economics (Horrigan [1987], Frankfurter and McGoun [2002], Frankfurter
[2006]).
The relative paucity of literature on ethics in financial economics, as compared to schol-
arship on ethics in other technology based professions, probably comes about because the
discipline is explicitly mathematical and mathematics strives to be infallible by maintaining a
strict fact/value dichotomy. Therefore, in order to achieve its objective the paper will abandon
the fact/value dichotomy in financial economics. This path is justified by adopting a Prag-
matic approach, which is characterised by arguing that knowledge has no certain, infallible,
foundations and because scientists are part of the system they observe, there can be no real
distinction between what is and what ought to be. A consequence of adopting a Pragmatic
approach is that the historical evolution of beliefs and the role that practice has in generating
theory are an important themes running through the paper. [Misak, 2009, Introduction]
Pragmatism addresses the question of ‘what is’; the ‘fact’, the paper addresses ‘what ought
to be’; the ‘value’, by taking a Virtue Ethics approach, as employed in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries and is a growing area of interest (e.g. Fontrodona et al. [2013]). Taken
together, these two approaches distinguish the paper from either Horrigan or Frankfurter and
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McGoun.
As a consequence of taking this approach is that this paper concludes that contemporary
financial economics has an implicit foundation in ethics, specifically Justice expressed as bal-
anced reciprocity. This conclusion is arrived at by showing that one of the fundamental theory
of financial economics, the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing (hereafter ‘FTAP’), has
its basis in the virtue ‘Justice’. The FTAP is the mathematical theory underpinning mod-
elling frameworks such as Black-Scholes-Merton, Cox-Ross-Rubinstein, Heath-Jarrow-Morton
and the LIBOR Market Models and is the central theory in contemporary mathematical ap-
proaches to pricing derivatives. Its significance is in unifying various strands in financial
economics: Samuelson and Merton’s use of stochastic calculus; CAPM, developed by Treynor
and Sharpe; martingales, employed by Fama in the development of the Efficient Markets Hy-
pothesis; Arrow and Debreu’s concept of incomplete markets. In accomplishing this unification
it represents a Kuhnian paradigm for financial economics.
Arguing that reciprocity is implicit and embedded in contemporary financial economics
is unorthodox; it is more normal to argue that markets are socially destructive (e.g. Kotz
[2009], Rogalski [2010] ) or have the potential for corruption if not constrained (e.g. Davidson
[2008, p 55], Crotty [2009, p 564], Lawson [2009, p 769], Turner [2009, p 14]), and so financial
economics is immoral in facilitating this corruption. These attitudes have a powerful influence
on how investigations of the causes of The Crises are framed. In order to address these framing
issues, we discus the changing social attitudes to markets in order to provide some context to
the thesis that financial economics is implicitly ethical.
The paper is presented as follows. It begins with a general introduction to Pragmatism,
in the context of other epistemological frameworks, and Virtue Ethics, in the context of other
ethical frameworks, before moving onto an overview of cultural attitudes to the morality
of markets. Section 3 describes the emergence of probability between the thirteenth and
seventeenth centuries. It is significant as discussions of ethics and financial economics rarely
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consider the interaction between theory, practice and morality before Adam Smith. This is an
important oversight as the ethical assessment of medieval and seventeenth century commercial
practice had a profound effect on the subsequent development of science, in particular of
mathematical probability. These arguments provide a basis for a deconstruction of the FTAP
as a theory based on reciprocity, which is undertaken in Section 4. The final Section extends the
observation that the FTAP is based on reciprocity to the conjecture that the whole of financial
economics is founded on the norm. This develops into a discussion of the relationship between
commerce and Pragmatic philosophy and offers a novel explanation for recent financial crises
as well as a possible regulatory approach to mitigate future crises.
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2 Fact, Value and the Morality of Markets
2.1 Fact
Determining what is is part of epistemology, and epistemological theories can be broadly
separated into two classes, foundational and coherentist. “Foundational theories attempt to
ground knowledge in a solid base such as sense experience [Empiricism] or a priori reasoning
[Realism]. In contrast, coherentists argue that there are no foundations for our beliefs, whose
justification derives from how well they fit together with each other.”[Thagard and Beam,
2004]
Realism argues that there is an ‘intelligible’ universe, of immutable truths, and a ‘sensible’
universe, that is actually experienced and undergoes change. ‘Truth’ transcends experience
and can be established only through abstract thinking (Rationality). Realism, in the Christian
and Islamic traditions, can be traced to Plato’s Theory of Forms (or Ideals) and was central
to Descartes’ and Kant’s philosophy. In this framework, there is a hierarchy of knowledge
with mathematics being closer to ‘truth’ than experimentation. Beliefs in the immutability
and indubitability of mathematics became embedded in western philosophy with the Neo-
Platonists, such as Augustine of Hippo, who associated mathematics with a transcendental
deity [Augustine of Hippo, 1993, p 46].
Contemporary Empiricism argues that there are two types of truth: tautologies, estab-
lished through formal mathematics or logic; and factual statements that can be verified by
employing the ‘scientific method’ to guide observation and analysis. A principal of Empiricism
is that while ‘Truth’ might be unachievable, the scientific method will converge towards a close
approximation of true facts. European Empiricism has its roots in Greek Epicureanism and
became dominant in British philosophy through Francis Bacon, John Locke, David Hume and
J. S. Mill. Logical Positivism, a form of Empiricism, emerged in Vienna in the early twentieth
century and became significant in North America in the 1940s.
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While Empiricists reject the metaphysics of Realism, they generally do not challenge the
status of mathematics and created a special class of Truth related to Hilbert’s Formalism.
To appreciate the distinction between Realism and Empiricism, a Realist might claim that
“2+2 = 4 was true at the time of the dinosaurs”, implying the mathematics is independent of
human thought (synthetic a priori); an Empiricist would claim the statement is a tautology:
2 := 1 + 1, 4 := 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 and so 2 + 2 = (1 + 1) + (1 + 1) = 4 (analytic a posterior).
Within economics, Realism is associated with Neo-classical theories that employ equilib-
rium and rationality and resort to ceteris paribus arguments to explain why economic facts
(what is experienced) rarely conform to Neo-classical theory [Arnold and Maier-Rigaud, 2012].
Contemporary economics in the Empirical spirit includes experimental and behavioural eco-
nomics (e.g. Vernon Smith, Daniel Kahneman).
Realism and Empiricism are foundational theories built on the idea that the scientist is a
‘spectator’ observing phenomena at a distance and as a result ‘Truth’ is a static representa-
tion of phenomena. Pragmatism, on the other hand, argues that the scientist is part of the
phenomena they observe and so ‘objectivity’ is unachievable, as a result ‘Truth’ is just what
competent, rational enquiry produces and will evolve in time. Pragmatism emerged in the
late nineteenth century with Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey and then by
Willard Van Orman Quine, Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty, and more recently by Susan
Haack, Robert Brandom and Cheryl Misak, amongst others. While closely associated with
American philosophy, there have been Pragmatic strands in French thought, associated with
Greek Sophism, notably the ‘occasional Pragmatism’ of Henri Poincare´ [Heinzmann, 2010]
while E´mile Durkheim acknowledged the usefulness of Pragmatism in destroying “the cult of
truth” (Laufer [2009], Durkheim and Allcock [1983, pp 69-72]). In Britain, Pragmatism has
been associated with the Cambridge School, particularly with (the later) Wittgenstein and
now with Huw Price. Pragmatism overlaps Empiricism (e.g. Peirce, Quine) and Realism (e.g.
Brandom, Putnam) [Rorty, 1982, pp xvi–xvii].
8
Pragmatism does not assign a special status to mathematics, in the way that Realism and
Empiricism do, Putnam argues that
we learn what mathematical truth is by learning the practices and standards of
mathematics itself, including the practices of applying mathematics. [Putnam,
2004, p 66]
while Poincare´ observed that
The principal aim of mathematical education is to develop certain faculties of the
mind, and among these intuition1 is not the least precious. It is through it that
the mathematical world remains in touch with the real world, and even if pure
mathematics could do without it, we should still have to have recourse to it to fill
up the gulf that separates the symbol from reality. [Poincare´, 1908 (2001), p 449]
Pragmatism is being associated with a revival of ‘classical economics’ [Martins, 2011], is
close to Pasinetti’s description of the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics [Pasinetti,
2005], relates to Deirdre McCloskey’s economics founded on rhetoric (discourse) [McCloskey,
2010], has been linked to behavioural economics [Khalil, 2004] and institutional economics
[Barbalet, 2008]. Pragmatic approaches are distinguished by acknowledging ethical features
of economic behaviour and emphasising the role of uncertainty (James [1896 (2009)], Dewey
[2005]). For example, Friedman’s argument in The Methodology of Positive Economics appears
to share principles of Pragmatism [Khalil, 2004, p 2]: “[Positive economics’] performance is
to be judged by the precision, scope, and conformity with experience” [Friedman, 1953, p 4].
However, Friedman’s rejection of a normative, subjective, dimension to economics and a faith
in the ability to verify stable economic theories makes it incompatible with Pragmatism.
9
2.2 Value
Ethical frameworks, in the Western tradition, are usually classed as being Deontological,
Consequentialist or Virtuous. Deontology can be typified as “Thou shalt / shalt not” and
guides action on the basis of laws, rules or principles. Since an individual cannot be subject
to a law unless it has been promulgated, Deontology is linked to with philosophical systems
that are based on ‘divine’ or ‘natural’ law, such as Realism and Stoicism [Anscombe, 1958, p
14]. The practical problem with Deontological Ethics is that basic rules such as “Thou shalt
not kill” have caveats while other prohibitions become redundant, or need revising, as society
evolves. In the context of contemporary economics, Deontological Ethics has been employed
in financial regulation (e.g. Pillars I & II of Basel II) and has been criticised for being over-
bureaucratic and rigid while susceptible to ‘gaming’; adhering to the letter of the law but not
the spirit. [Van Staveren, 2007, pp 23–26]
Consequentialism attempts to judge the value of an action in terms of its consequences.
This approach has its roots in ancient Chinese Mohism and Greek Epicureanism, developed in
opposition to Platonism and Stoicism. The approach became fully developed in the nineteenth
century with a trio of British philosophers, Bentham, Mill and Sedgewick, who argued that
one should “Act always in such a way as to promote the greatest happiness to the greatest
number”.
On the basis of Consequentialism and David Hume’s distinction of ‘what is’ and ‘what
ought to be’, ‘value–neutrality’ was established in economics: since we have ‘objective access’
to the empirical world’ and are ‘rational beings’, we are able to calculate the consequences of
our economic actions [Wilber and Hoksbergen, 1986]. A problem with this value-neutrality,
described by Robert Heilbroner, is that it misses the critical fact that
the objects observed by the social scientist all possess an attribute that is lacking
in the objects of natural universe. This is the attribute of consciousness – of
cognition, of “calculation”, of volition [Heilbroner, 1973, p 133]
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The importance of ‘volition’ had been recognised by Oskar Morgenstern, who objected to
perfect foresight based on calculation because
always there is exhibited an endless chain of reciprocally conjectural reactions
and counter-reactions. This chain can never be broken by an act of knowledge
but always through an arbitrary act – a resolution. [Mirowski, 1992, quoting
Mogernstern on p 129]
As well as questioning the basic ability to predict in a social context, Consequentialism has
been criticised because obviously immoral acts, such as the execution of the innocent, could
be justified either by the hope of good consequences or the fear of bad [Anscombe, 1958, p 14].
In response to the problems of Deontological and Consequentialist Ethics, many argue that
ethics should focus on the judgement of the agent taking the action that has consequences, or
Virtue Ethics.
Virtue Ethics, in the Western tradition, is associated with Aristotle, in particular Nico-
machean Ethics in which virtues are the “characteristics that enable individuals to live well in
communities” [Pojam, 1998, p 247]. Aristotle’s ethics do not distinguish reason and emotion,
as Hume did in the eighteenth century, nor do they define absolute standards, rather Virtue
is a consequence of personal reflection [Van Staveren, 2001, pp 6–8]. This opens Virtue Ethics
to the criticism that it cannot be codified into a set of rules that any person could apply to
determine ethical action in any situation. However, this criticism assumes such a reduction is
possible, and implicit in this is that the environment is stable and predictable. The advantage
of Virtue Ethics is precisely that it can accommodate unforeseen circumstances.
Medieval Catholic Scholars approached Virtue Ethics using the same framework that they
used to study physics or medicine, by blending elements, or humours, in the right manner.
Their elements of morality are the four ‘Cardinal’ virtues; Courage; Justice; Temperance;
and Prudence, and three, so-called, ‘Christian’ virtues: Faith; Hope; and Charity. All these
virtues existed in pre-Christian Greek and Roman philosophy, which influenced both Judaic
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and Islamic thought. Chinese (e.g. [Wang, 2010]) and Indian philosophy both have versions
of Virtue Ethics that can be mapped onto the European framework. Particularly relevant is
the first century Mahayana Buddhist Vimalakirti Sutra that tells the story of how a virtuous
merchant instructs both kings and monks.
While it is conventional to associate Deontology with Realism and Consequentialism with
Empiricism, associating Virtue Ethics with Pragmatism is less conventional. There are links,
notably through John Dewey [Carden, 2006] and in the discussion of reciprocity [Pagan, 2008].
More broadly, Aristotle argued that excellence of character [e¯thike¯] derives from ‘habituation’
[eˇthos ] [Broadie and Rowe, 2011, 1103a15–20]. This can be related to the technical term
‘Pragmatism’, which is derived from the Greek word describing ‘deed, act, affair, matter,
business’ [pragma]; both terms emphasise ‘practice’ over ‘theory’.
With these observations in mind, Khalil makes the point that “true [Pragmatic] inquiry
cannot take place in an ivory tower” [Khalil, 2004, p 2] and discourse, in enabling rational
enquiry, is central to Pragmatism. In particular Ju¨rgen Habermas has developed the principle
of ‘communicative action’, where communities solve problems through discussion. Habermas
defines a ‘norm’ as a “universally valid statement of obligation”, which some might equate with
a ‘virtue’. The “binding universal norm” is ‘communicative action’, “norms of communication
governed by the ideal of rational discourse” and, according to Putnam, the ideal of rational
discourse is governed by
the norm of sincerity, the norm of truth-telling, and the norm of asserting only
what is rationally warranted . . . [and] is contrasted with manipulation. [Putnam,
2002, pp 113-114]
Putnam observes that the problem of leading an ethical life is a fact of life that cannot be
solved ex cathedra by philosophy external to the individual, such as with Deontology and
Consequentialism.
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2.3 The Morality of Markets
Albert Hirschman has provided a description of four different views on the relationship between
markets and morality: doux-commerce, self-destruction, feudal-shackles and feudal-benefits
[Hirschman, 1982]. The idea that commerce improved society was prevalent throughout the
eighteenth century. In 1704 technical text on commerce argues “Commerce attaches [men] to
one another through mutual utility”; while in The Rights of Man (1792) Thomas Paine writes
“[Commerce is a pacific system, operating to cordialise mankind”. In the intervening years
Montesquieu, Hume, Condorcet and Adam Smith all agreed that commerce was a powerful
civilising agent, promoting honesty, industriousness, probity, punctuality, and frugality, in
contrast to the excesses of absolute monarchies.
Following the Industrial Revolution, these attitudes all but disappeared and were replaced
by views that blamed the collapse of morality on the influence of capitalism. Commerce
was seen as commodifying human interaction, “custom is replaced by contract”, and on this
basis Romantics saw capitalism as being un-natural and undermined traditional hierarchies
while Marxists believed that commerce’s alienation of the proletariat along with capitalism’s
instabilities would lead to revolution. Others believed that the success of capitalism, founded
on frugality and probity, would be so great that society would eventually become dissolute,
seeking instant gratification, echoing the rise of Republican Rome and the fall of Imperial
Rome.
Both the doux and self-destructive views of commerce represented capitalism as a power-
ful force driving social change. When capitalism did not collapse, the emphasis changed and
capitalism was not seen as strong but weak: the bourgeoisie were unable to escape traditional
social forces. The United States of America, not bound by “feudal–shackles” seemed to have
an advantage over Europe between 1914 and the sixties. Capitalism, led by America, seemed
to rediscover its confidence in solving society’s problems after the Second World War. But this
confidence was lost in the economic malaise of the seventies. Because America did not have
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the feudal past of Europe it did not have social and ideological diversity and so reforms, such
as Roosevelt’s New Deal, were vulnerable to a “tyranny of the majority”; America missed the
feudal–blessings. Daniel Friedman has recently presented the relationship between markets
and morals as a difficult marriage: “where markets sabotaged morals, and morals hurt mar-
kets” [Friedman, 2008, p 4]. In the aftermath of The Crisis, and of particular interest to this
project, Johan Graafland has related contemporary economic literature to the doux-commerce
and self-destruction theses in the context of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics [Graafland, 2009].
Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy [Fourcade and Healy, 2007] have recently returned to
Hirschman’s characterisation and argue that it is still valid today, but have added a fifth
characterisation: Moralized Markets. In their paper Fourcade and Healy identify the four
strands of Hirschman’s thesis in recent scholarship starting with doux-commerce summarising
Deirdre McCloskey’s argument that markets nurture “bourgeois virtues” as
Commerce teaches ethics mainly through its communicative dimension, that is, by
promoting conversations among equals and exchange between strangers. [Fourcade and Healy,
2007, p 287]
Researchers performing empirical studies on the Ultimatum Game (introduced the year of
Hirschman’s thesis, by Gu¨th et al. [1982]), argue that commerce fosters co-operation, par-
ticularity amongst strangers while others support Hayek’s argument that “Capitalism makes
you free”. Finally, some economists look for evidence that markets are the best motor for
innovation. In opposition to these strands, economists are arguing that instead of virtue we
have envy, instead of co-operation there is coercion, freedom does not equate to populism and
creativity is being stifled by copyright.
While economists seem to focus on the robust nature of markets, able to create or de-
stroy society, sociologists tend to study the feebleness of markets. Following Weber, some
authors argue that markets are consequences of cultural legacy, of institutions. The new
Moralized Markets thesis goes further, it characterises markets as ‘cultures’, not simply a
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consequence of culture, which “are explicitly moral projects, saturated with normativity.”
[Fourcade and Healy, 2007, pp 299-300].
Fourcade and Healy identify three strands of the Moralized Markets thesis. Firstly, there
is the view that markets have a role in creating moral boundaries, as McCloskey argues.
This approach follows Durkheim, who argued that morality is not fixed by some ‘Ontological’
ethical standard (that is, one fixed and derived from a single issue [Putnam, 2004, p 19]);
rather, morality is defined by the group.
The second strand builds on the first by turning to the sociology of science, where an
emphasis is placed on impartiality in evaluating scientific knowledge (i.e. it studies failures as
well as successes). A key theme in this approach is to study what Michael Callon called the
‘performativity of markets’, that economic theory drives economic behaviour, rather than that
theory describes economic behaviour; in the words of Donald MacKenzie, financial economics
is “An engine not a camera”. These views are close to the Pragmatic attitude, that Empiricism
and Rationalism fail by not acknowledging that scientists are an active part of the system they
observe [Bacon, 2012, pp 35–37, 50–53].
While the second strand of the Moralized Markets thesis focuses on behaviour at the
micro level, the third strand considers economic rules at the macro level and how they are
saturated with normative considerations. For example, when Friedman made the case for
positive economics it was “to make correct predictions” [Friedman, 1953, p 4] he ignored
the question of what determines ‘correct’, and this driven by mutable normative values. For
example determining ‘correctness’ has changed with the emergence of the value ‘efficiency’
and the decline of ‘social cohesion’.
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3 The Emergence of Probability
3.1 Medieval Finance
From 1000 C.E. until about 1300 C.E. there was a rapid development of the economy in West-
ern Europe as it evolved from an agriculturally based feudal society towards a commercially
based bourgeois society, initially in Italy then, in the twelfth century, in North Western Eu-
rope. One physical manifestation of this change was the volume of coin circulating in the
European economy, as the population doubled over the three hundred years, the amount of
coin per person tripled. (Pounds [1994, Chapter 3 & 4], Kaye [1998, pp 15–16], Nicholas [2006,
p 72])
3.1.1 Practice
Medieval European merchants, unlike their contemporaries in the Middle East, India or China,
had to contend simultaneously with prohibitions on usury and the heterogeneity of currency.
Muslim merchants had usury prohibitions but homogeneous currency, Indian and Chinese
merchants had to (sometimes) deal with heterogeneous currencies but without the centralised
religious prohibitions on usury.
Usury derives from the Latin usus meaning ‘use’, and referred to the charging of a fee
for the use of money. Interest comes from the Latin interesse and originated in the Roman
legal codes as the compensation paid if a contract was broken [Homer and Sylla, 1996, p 73].
Shortly after 1200 the theologian, Peter the Chanter, argued that “a buyer or seller may
be excused from usury if he exposes himself to the risk of receiving more or less” [Franklin,
2001, pp 263–264] and this idea that usury was absent in the presence of risk became firmly
established in the thirteenth century.
The basic financial instrument at this time was the census that originated when ninth
century monasteries guaranteed a fixed regular income in exchange for a donation of land.
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Censii developed to be written on the back of a diverse range of assets, including a craftsman’s
labour, resembling modern day securitisation. In time ‘structured’ contracts emerged such that
a borrower would receive a lump sum secured against the future cash-flow from an asset, rente
a` prix d’argent, without necessarily relinquishing ownership of the asset (Homer and Sylla
[1996, pp 75–76], Poitras [2000, pp 31–33]).
Modern structured finance was anticipated in the triple, or German, contract (contractus
trinus), developed to fund long distance trade. It involved a loan to fund the venture (the
first contract); the transformation of the variable return of the venture into fixed cash-flow
(the second contract); and an insurance contract to guarantee the fixed payment (the third
contract). In terms of contemporary finance this third contract is a Credit Default Swap and
the whole contract has the same structure of a Special Purpose Vehicle. This contract was
declared illicit by the Catholic Church in 1586 on the basis that the lender received a risk-less
return. [Noonan, 1957, pp 209–220]
The heterogeneity of currency was a consequence of feudalism and the desire of magnates
to assert their authority by issuing coin. The Italian peninsula had over twenty currencies,
the Kingdom of France three, and each prince of the Holy Roman Empire would mint their
own coin. Alfred Crosby describes the activities of a Tuscan merchant in supplying cloth
to Venice from Mallorcan wool that involved at least five currencies [Crosby, 1997, p 201].
William Goetzman explains that as a consequence of the multitude of currencies, European
medieval merchants “operated in a world of complete relativism” [Goetzmann, 2004] while
Crosby remarks that there was an “abstraction of Western merchants’ scale of value” and “no
people were more obsessed with counting and counting and counting”[Crosby, 1997, p 72, 74].
A solution to the problem of the complexity of Medieval commerce came in Fibonacci’s
Liber Abaci first published in 1202, the initiant of Financial Economics ([Crosby, 1997, 43–47],
[Sigler, 2002, Introduction]). It was an immediate success and a second edition was produced
in 1228, a remarkable feat in an age when books were hand copied [Sigler, 2002, p 4]. The
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text introduces Arabic/Hindu numerals and explains basic arithmetic over seven chapters. It
then presents four chapters applying the theory by presenting cases on practical commercial
problems. The text finishes with a more theoretical section on iterating to a solution of a
problem. ([Sigler, 2002], [Goetzmann, 2004])
Before the Liber Abaci, European merchants, like their contemporaries across the globe,
would have used an abacus to perform arithmetic calculations, and once a calculation had
been made, it was recorded. The technologies described in the Liber Abaci, particularly Hindu
numbers, meant that merchants could write down their calculation method, the algorithm,
which could be copied and modified by others. Knowledge, in the form of best practice, could
be created, distributed and improved.
Abaco or rekoning schools sprang up throughout Europe teaching apprentice merchants
the techniques originating the Liber Abaci. The impact of these abaco schools was enormous,
algebra became an important tool used by the large and influential community of Europeans
and would provide the reservoir of mathematicians on which the scientific developments of the
seventeenth century were built. The unique circumstances of medieval European commercial
practice offer a solution to Needham’s question that asks why European technological devel-
opment accelerated so much faster than Chinese after 1600. (Hadden [1994, Chapter 1], Sigler
[2002, Introduction], Heeffer [2008])
3.1.2 Theory
The societal changes before 1200 led to a need to revitalise the Catholic Church, particularly
to combat unorthodoxy such as Catharism. The Dominican and Franciscan orders were estab-
lished to engage with the emerging bourgeoisie and would come to dominate Scholasticism, the
intellectual movement that integrated Greek philosophy and Christian theology in Europe’s
universities until the Reformation.
The science that emerged in Western Europe in the seventeenth century is distinctive in its
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use of mathematics to describe the laws of nature. The Greeks, and their Muslim successors,
generally regarded ‘pure’ mathematics as being irrelevant to the sensible world while Chinese
scientists used mathematics to calculate but not to describe ([Crosby, 1997, p 16], Dear [2001,
p 164], [Fara, 2009, p 53]). Richard Hadden, Alfred Crosby and Joel Kaye have all argued that
the ‘mathematisation’ of European science began with the synthesis of commercial practice
and Scholastic ethics in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Hadden [1994], Crosby [1997],
Kaye [1998]).
A key component of this synthesis was Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics that addresses how
an individual can live as part of a community and it discusses economics in Book V in the
context of the virtue of Justice. Aristotle saw reciprocity in exchange as being important
in binding society together, and Aristotle believed exchange was performed to correct for
inequalities in endowment and to establish a social equilibrium, not in order to generate a
profit (Kaye [1998, p 51], Broadie and Rowe [2011, 1133a15–30]).
Aristotle distinguishes economic justice into two classes, distributive and directive (or cor-
rective, restorative). Distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of common goods
by a central authority in proportion to the recipients’ worth and is determined by equating
Geometric Proportions. Directive justice applies in cases where the parties are considered to
be equal, for example in commerce, in which case justice is determined by equating Arith-
metic Proportion and is based on reciprocity (Kaye [1998, p 41–43], Broadie and Rowe [2011,
1130b30–31a5]).
What is most striking in Aristotle’s treatment of economic exchange is that he approached
it as a mathematical problem. This is remarkable in itself because Aristotle rarely applied
mathematics to the sensible world elsewhere (Hadden [1994, p 75], Crosby [1997, p 13],
Broadie and Rowe [2011, 1094b15–28]). Aristotle realised that if there was to be equality
and Justice then
everything that is exchanged must be somehow comparable. This is the role that
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is fulfilled by currency [nomisma], so that it becomes, in a way, an intermediate
[Broadie and Rowe, 2011, 1133a19–20]
These lines are significant for two reasons. Firstly the word nomisma for currency/money is
related to the concepts of custom and law, not to ‘labour and expenses’. Secondly, ‘intermedi-
ate’ is in the sense of a mediator between two objects, rather than simply as a token, which is a
more modern interpretation. Furthermore, Aristotle defined the quality that money measured
by the word chreia, which was initially translated to opus (work), but was later corrected
to indigentia (need) [Kaye, 1998, pp 68–70]. This is important because it demonstrates that
Aristotle and the Scholastics viewed money as a social construction binding society by allow-
ing an exchange based on need, rather than as a simple commodity facilitating the exchange
of sensible quantities, such as labour and expenses.
The significance of the Scholastic analysis to the development of science was that when
Aristotle discussed measurement in the context of physics he argued that the measure shared
the ‘substance’ of the measured; this meant that wine was incommensurable with cloth, time
incommensurable with space. The Scholastics realised that money was a very special measure;
it applied to all goods in a market, and only occasionally shared the substance of the goods.
This insight enabled them to revolutionise the concept of measurement, in a way that contem-
porary Muslim scholars did not, and allowed Jean Buridan to identify the concept of inertia.
(Boyer and Merzbach [1991, p 263-268], Crosby [1997, p 67–74], Kaye [1998, pp 65–70])
Out of Aristotle’s discussion of market exchange, Scholastics developed the concept of
the ‘Just Price’, which has been the subject of considerable modern debate. For example,
Raymond de Roover [de Roover, 1958], argues against viewing the Just Price in a Marxist,
labour theory of value, sense but rather as the market price, in a neo-classical, liberal sense.
However, neither of these modern positions corresponds to how the Scholastics viewed the
concept. The interpretation of the Just Price we shall employ, based on the Scholastic attitudes
to Aristotle’s description of exchange, is the one discussed by Fabio Monsalve [Monsalve,
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In press, pp 6–7]. The Just Price represents an “intellectual construct: an ideal price that
guarantees equality in exchange” and that it represents a mathematical ‘medium’ or a ‘mean’.
Monsalve points out that Scholastic analysis was conducted in a definite moral frame of
reference, and so the Just Price “could not refer indiscriminately to whatever price might
be obtained in the market” [Monsalve, In press, p 8, quoting Langholm]. This aspect was
discussed in detail by the Scholastics prompted by a question ‘Whether the seller is bound
to state the defects of the thing sold?’ posed by the important Dominican Thomas Aquinas
[Aquinas, 1947, II, ii, qu. 77, art. 3, ad. 4]. Specifically Aquinas addresses a problem
originating in Stoic philosophy relating to the conduct of a merchant carrying a supply of food
to a starving country. The merchant knows that they are the first of a number of merchants
bringing food, the question is, should he sell the food at the high ‘market’ price or a lower
price based on his knowledge.
Kaye makes the point that Aquinas separates the Just Price, determined by divine law,
from the ‘market price’, established by men, and explains that if the Just Price equated
with the market price then an “individual’s responsibility in economic activity is effectively
eliminated” [Kaye, 1998, p 98]. Despite realising this distinction, the answer from Aquinas is
a little surprising. Aquinas observes that the merchant may believe that there are more grain
shipments on the way, but does not know : the future is uncertain. On the basis that there is
no certainty, and on the authority of Peter the Chanter, the merchant may charge the going
market price, making an excessive but nevertheless legitimate profit, though it would be more
virtuous to charge the lower price.
Aquinas’ argument was criticised by a leader of the ‘Spiritual Franciscans’, Pierre Jean
Olivi. The Spiritual Franciscans argued that the vow of poverty meant monks should limit their
use of property, usus pauper, not simply not own property. As a consequence of this extreme
position Olivi was posthumously condemned as a heretic in 1326, hindering the subsequent
transmission of his thought. The Franciscans, unlike the empirical rationalist Dominicans such
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as Thomas Aquinas, were fideists and this philosophical approach meant that Olivi argued
that the metaphysical probability of more grain arriving had a certain reality, which Aquinas
was ignoring [Kaye, 1998, p 121]. Olivi said
The judgement of the value of a thing in exchange seldom or never can be made
except through conjecture or probable opinion, and not so precisely, or as if under-
stood and measured by one invisible point, but rather as a fitting latitude within
which the diverse judgements of men will differ in estimation [Kaye, 1998, p 124].
This distinction is essential in demarcating the Just Price, an imprecise abstraction, from the
market price, which is observed at a fixed point [Monsalve, In press, Section 3.2.1].
Olivi seems to have interacted with merchants and been a close observer of markets and
considered a number of aspects of commerce including the problem of usury [Franklin, 2001,
p 265]. Based on the principle that a lender could charge a borrower compensation for a loss
(interesse) Olivi recognised that borrowers should compensate lenders for the ‘probable profit’
they could earn by employing capital elsewhere. Fair exchange was a question of restoring
‘probable equivalence’, not of precise equality (Kaye [1998, p 119], Franklin [2001, pp 265–
267]). As part of this argument Olivi commented that a valuation did not only depend on ‘need’
but also on a good’s scarcity, usefulness and desirability. Since both need and desirability are
subjective, different people will value the same good differently and based on these ideas, Olivi
was able also to explain the ‘value paradox’ (Rothbard [1996, pp 60–61], Kaye [1998, pp 123–
124]). Ultimately, according to James Franklin, Olivi thought of probability as a trade-able
entity, and so could be quantified [Franklin, 2001, pp 266–267].
3.2 The Science of Conjecture
The Science of Conjecture, or Probability, is the rational method for dealing with uncertainty.
Aristotle classified events into three types: certain events determined by specific causes; prob-
able events that usually happened; and unpredictable events, including games of chance, not
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amenable to science [Hald, 1990, p 30]. The development of Probability over the past five
hundred years has been concerned principally with reducing the scope of those events ‘not
amenable to science’ in support of the Cartesian programme to place knowledge on indu-
bitable foundations [Grayling, 2005, pp 281–285].
While Olivi and merchants developed the idea of probability in relation to commercial
exchange and jurists and theologians addressed questions of proof, the concept of quantifying
chance did not fully materialise until the mid-sixteenth century with Cardano’s Liber de Ludo
Alea. Ian Hacking has remarked [Hacking, 1984, Chapter 1] that the emergence of the concept
of absolute chance was late; however, this identification of mathematical probability in the
context of finance precedes both Descartes’ introduction of absolute space (Cartesian co-
ordinates) and Newton’s of absolute time.
Up until the 1950s, and a re-assessment of his work by Øystein Ore [Ore, 1953], Cardano’s
contribution to probability theory had been widely ignored. In the context frequentist in-
terpretations of probability, that dominated the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it
was seen as incoherent. More recently, David Bellhouse [Bellhouse, 2005] has re-evaluated the
Liber looking at it as a humanist philosophical text, not as a mathematical document, based
on the fact that Cardano, himself, did not list it as one of his mathematical works. Bellhouse’s
hypothesis is that in the Liber Cardano is trying to establish under what grounds gambling
can be considered ethical in the context of Nicomachean Ethics.
Cardano latches on to the idea that Justice is equivalent to equality and argues that in
dice games ‘equality’ was established by counting the ways a player could win and comparing
that number to the ways a player would lose. On this basis the ‘chance’ of winning could be
deduced, and if the stakes did not match the chances, the gamble was unjust. Summarising his
findings he states, “a just gamble is one between willing and knowledgeable players”, making
an explicit association between science and ethics. Almost immediately after coming to these
ethical conclusions, Cardano observes that
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These facts contribute a great deal to understanding but hardly anything to prac-
tical play [David, 1962 (1998), p 58 quoting from Chapter 9 of the Liber ]
since they offer nothing to help forecast the outcome of the dice throw.
Throughout the sixteenth century there was a flow of mathematical thinking from the
vernacular abaco schools into academic circles, not just in the universities that had declined
in status during the Renaissance but also into the courts of autocrats. For example, Lucca
Pacioli was trained in the abaco tradition, probably by Piero della Francesca, before working
for a Venetian merchant. He then took Franciscan orders and entered the University of Perugia
before ultimately joining the court of the Milanese autocrat, Lodovico Sforza, where he taught
perspective to Leonardo da Vinci. Thomas Gresham was born into an important English
commercial family around the time Pacioli died and spent much of his life manipulating the
exchange rate in Antwerp on behalf of the English monarchy. When he died he created the
first chair in mathematics in England with the establishment of Gresham College, which was
the foundation of the Royal Society ([Johnson, 1940], [Burgon, 2004]). Simon Stevin also
trained in the abaco tradition and worked as a merchant’s clerk then as a tax official before
moving to the University of Leiden in 1583. Ten years later he became involved with the
government of the Dutch Republic during the wars of independence against Spain. As part
of the war effort, the Dutch Mathematical School was established to train military engineers
with Stevin as Director. Stevin’s vocational syllabus attracted soldiers (such as Descartes)
and merchants from across northern Europe and the fees they paid raised the status of its
mathematicians, who when associated with the scholastic syllabus of abstract arithmetic and
geometry, astronomy and music, were widely regarded as irrelevant. Stevin wrote a number of
textbooks in French or Dutch, not in the exclusive Latin of the universities, which became read
widely and emphasised the practical usefulness of mathematics in everyday life. His influence
was profound and forced other institutions change their curricula; our use of decimal notation
is due to Stevin who recognised its utility in commerce. (Sarton [1934], Mirowski [1989, p
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121], Poitras [2000, pp 131–132], Dear [2001, p 104])
One problem Cardano considered was the so-called Problem of Points which appears in a
text by Pacioli and is based on the following situation:
Two players, F and P , are playing a game based on a sequence of rounds, and
each round consists of, for example, the tossing of a fair coin. The winner of the
game is the player who is the first to win 7 rounds, and they will win 80 francs.
The Problem of Points is how the 80 francs should be split if the game is forced to end after
P has won 5 rounds while F has won 4.
Edith Dudley Sylla notes that the Problem comes from the abaco tradition of using ‘stories’
to give examples of how to solve problems in commercial arithmetic. In this case the Problem
of Points, the story represents the case of how the capital tied up in a business partnership
should be divided if the venture has to finish prematurely [Sylla, 2003].
Pacioli’s solution was statistical, the pot should be split 5:4. Cardano realised this was
absurd since it would give a manifestly unfair result if the game ended after one round out of a
hundred or when F had 99 wins to P ’s 90. Cardano makes the point that the correct solution
would be arrived at by considering what would happen in the future, it had to be forward-
looking, in particular it had to account for what ‘paths’ the game would follow. Despite this
insight, Cardano’s solution was still wrong, and the correct solution was provided by Pascal
and Fermat in their correspondence of 1654.
The Pascal-Fermat solution to the Problem of Points is widely regarded as the starting
point of mathematical probability. The pair (it is not known exactly who) realised that when
Cardano calculated that P could win the pot if the game followed the path PP (i.e. P wins
and P wins again) this actually represented four paths, PPPP , PPPF , PPFP , PPFF , for
the game. It was the players’ ‘choice’ that the game ended after PP , not a feature of the
game itself and this represents an early example of mathematicians disentangling behaviour
from problem structure. Calculating the proportion of winning paths would come down to
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using the Arithmetic, or Pascal’s, Triangle – the Binomial distribution. Essentially, Pascal
and Fermat established what would today be recognised as the Cox-Ross-Rubenstein formula
[Cox et al., 1979] for pricing a digital call option.
The Pascal–Fermat correspondence was private, the first textbook on probability was writ-
ten by Christiaan Huygens in 1656. Huygens had visited Paris in late 1655 and had been told
of the Problem of Points, but not of its solution (David [1962 (1998), p 111], Hald [1990, p
67]), and on his return to the Netherlands he solved the problem for himself and produced
the first treatise on mathematical probability, Van Rekeningh in Speelen van Geluck (‘On the
Reckoning of Games of Chance’) in 1657.
In Van Rekeningh Huygens starts with, what is essentially, an axiom,
I take as fundamental for such [fair] games that the chance to gain something is
worth so much that, if one had it, one could get the same in a fair game, that is a
game in which nobody stands to lose. [Hald, 1990, p 69]
Probability is defined by equating future gain with present value in the context of ‘fair’ games.
In the 1670’s probability theory developed in the context of Louis XIV’s appartements
du roi, thrice weekly gambling events that have been described as a ‘symbolic activity’ not
unlike potlach ceremonies that bind primitive communities [Kavanagh, 1993, pp 31-42]. This
mathematical analysis of an important social activity stimulated the publication of books
describing objective, or frequentist, probability. The Empirical frequentist approach began to
dominate the mathematical treatment of probability following the claimed ‘defeat’, or ‘taming’,
of chance by mathematics with the publication of Montmort’s Essay d’Analyse sur les Jeux
de Hazard (‘Analytical Essay on Games of Chance’) of 1708 and De Moivre’s De Mensura
Sortis (‘The Measurement of Chance’), of 1711 developed in The Doctrine of Chances of 1718
[Bellhouse, 2008]. These texts were developed more in the context of gaming rather than in
the analysis of commercial contracts and The Doctrine was the more influential, introducing
the Central Limit Theorem, and by 1735 it was believed that there was no longer a class of
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events that were ‘unpredictable’ [Bellhouse, 2008].
Around 1684 James Bernoulli had begun working on problems in probability and between
1700 and his death in 1705 he worked on Ars Conjectandi (‘The Art of Conjecturing’), a title
that emphases the practical rather than theoretical nature of conjecture, which was published
posthumously in 1713. The Ars is made up of four parts, a commentary on Huygens’ Van
Rekeningh, original work on calculating permutations and combinations, applications of these
ideas to games of chance and finally the application of the ideas to “civil, moral and economic
affairs” [Hald, 1990, p 224].
While the first three sections of the Ars are un-controversial, the final section is both the
most significant and has proved problematic. Bernoulli, having discussed objective probability
at length introduces the epistemic, or subjective, definition of probability as “a degree of
certainty”. Anders Hald notes that this is “revolutionary” because Bernoulli is applying
mathematics to propositions, not just to events [Hald, 1990, p 225]. This section of the Ars
is significant in that it introduces what would become known as the ‘Law of Large Numbers’,
which can be summarised as collecting a large amount of data will improve the accuracy of
an observation – providing the system was stationary [Hald, 1990, p 225]. The section is
problematic because Bernoulli considered situations where the sum of probabilities could be
greater than one [Sylla, 2006, p 27]. This is impossible if probability is calculated as relative
frequency.
Sylla compared Bernoulli’s work to that of Huygens’ and other contemporaries, de Witt
and de Moivre, in the process of translating the Ars and concluded that
equity among associates or partners rather than probabilities in the sense of rela-
tive frequencies provided the foundation for the earliest mathematical probability
theory. [Sylla, 2006, p 13]
and that
27
While traditional histories of mathematical probability start with Pierre Fermat,
Pascal and Huygens because they give what are from the modern point of view
correct frequentist solutions to the problems of division and expectations in games
of chance . . . the foundations of Huygens’ method (. . . ) was not chance (frequentist
probability), but rather sors (expectation) in so far as it was involved in implicit
contracts and the just treatment of partners. [Sylla, 2006, p 28]
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the motivation for the development of probability
was in the ethical analysis of commercial contracts where Justice, or balanced reciprocity,
‘fairness’ dominated. The later Empirical approach to probability, based on observing relative
frequencies, emerged out of the simpler analysis of games of chance in the context of fixed
odds.
The case that Huygens was working in the context of Virtue Ethics is enhanced by recog-
nising the difficulty he had in translating Van Rekeningh into Latin [Hacking, 1984, pp 93–94].
Huygens struggled to translate the Dutch word kans (‘chance’, ‘lot’), which would normally
be translated as sors, and eventually he, or his editor van Schooten, chose expectatio, giving
the English term ‘expectation’ (in the mathematical sense). However, Huygens had considered
using the Latin word spes [Hacking, 1984, p 95] which was the term for the virtue ‘Hope’.
In French, espe´rance is used when referring to mathematical expectation, reflecting this de-
bate. The Dutch, who following Stevin’s focus on teaching mathematics in the vernacular, use
their own terms in mathematics, in this case the equivalent is verwachting : hope, promise,
expectation, forecast, prognosis.
Sylla also observes that The Port Royal Logic, a significant influence on Pascal, notes that
“because the house takes part of the stakes, lotteries are manifestly unfair” and seventeenth
century mathematicians recognised a distinction between actual gambles, involving transaction
costs, and idealised, frictionless, markets, suitable for the mathematical study by academics.
[Sylla, 2003, p 327]
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4 The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing consists of two statements, (e.g. [Shreve, 2004,
Section 5.4])
The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
1. A market admits no arbitrage, if and only if, the market has a martingale measure.
2. Every contingent claim can be hedged, if and only if, the martingale measure is unique.
4.1 The context of the FTAP
The FTAP emerged between 1979 and 1983 ([Harrison and Kreps, 1979], [Harrison and Pliska,
1981], [Harrison and Pliska, 1983]) as Michael Harrison sought to establish a mathematical
theory underpinning the Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM) equation for pricing options, which
was introduced in 1973.
In the late 1960s, Fischer Black and Myron Scholes worked as investment consultants
and one of the problems the pair addressed was the valuation of ‘warrants’, options bundled
with bonds. Black was an applied mathematician who had worked in consultancy for Jack
Treynor around the time that Treynor developed his version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM). Scholes had studied for a doctorate under Eugene Fama looking at risk-reward in
the context of efficient markets [Scholes, 1972]. Black tackled the problem of pricing warrants
as an applied mathematician: the value of the warrant would be a function of the underlying
asset’s price and amenable to the type of calculus that had been employed since Newton and
Leibnitz. Scholes approached the problem from a financial perspective: the risk of holding
a warrant could be removed by holding a complementary (short) position in the underlying
asset, by hedging. What Scholes did not know was how to establish the size of the hedging
portfolio, but when he discussed this with Black they realised the solution was in the slope of
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the function relating the warrant price and asset price, a result that had been anticipated by
Thorp and Kassouf [MacKenzie, 2008, pp 130–131].
Simultaneously, Robert C. Merton, who had studied advanced engineering mathematics
before becoming a student of Paul Samuelson, was considering the problem of pricing warrants
from a different perspective. Samuelson had never accepted Markowitz’s criterion of trading
the expected returns of a portfolio against the variance of returns [Samuelson, 1970], which was
a foundation of CAPM and Scholes’ work, so Merton tackled the problem of valuing warrants
by maximising expected utility employing the stochastic calculus that had become important
in aeronautical and electronic engineering. This work was published in 1969 ([Samuelson,
1969], [Merton, 1969]).
Despite the fact that Black never liked Merton’s highly mathematical technique, Scholes
discussed their work with Merton in 1970. Merton saw how the Black–Scholes approach
of hedging could be incorporated into his own continuous time models, removing the need
to incorporate an arbitrary utility function in solving the pricing problem. Merton showed
that a portfolio made up of: a single warrant, or an option; a hedging position in the risky
underlying asset; and a funding position in the riskless bank account, would offer the same,
certain, return as the initial cost of the portfolio deposited in the riskless bank account. It
seemed that both subjectivity and risk had been removed from the pricing problem.
In October 1970 Black and Scholes submitted their work to the Journal of Political Econ-
omy and then the Review of Economics and Statistics, but it was rejected without review,
on the basis that there was not enough economics in it. The paper was only published by
the Journal of Political Economy [Black and Scholes, 1973] in 1973 after the intervention of
influential academics and shortly after the opening of the Chicago Board Options Exchange
([Bernstein, 1998, p 314–315], [MacKenzie, 2008, pp 133–136]). Merton published his approach
almost simultaneously [Merton, 1973].
When BSM was being developed option pricing was a relatively unimportant activity.
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Gambling legislation in the United States meant that options were only traded on ‘deliverable’
assets, principally agricultural commodities, and these markets were stagnant [MacKenzie,
2008, pp 142-145]. However, following the ‘Nixon Shock’ of August 1971, the Bretton-Woods
system of fixed exchange rates collapsed and in the aftermath, interest rates, exchange rates
and commodity prices became much more volatile. Options, which have been a feature of
financial practice since the seventeenth century, and were widely traded before the suspension
of the European financial markets during the First World War [Nelson, 1904], re-emerged as
a tool to insure against volatile asset prices.
Despite the financial rational for options, their legitimacy with regard to gambling legis-
lation was still ambiguous. The introduction of BSM delivered a mathematical equation that
defined the price of an option in terms of known parameters, making their valuation determin-
istic. Trading in options could not be gambling, given that there was no speculation in their
valuation. Donald MacKenzie reports the view of the legal counsel to the Chicago Board of
Trade at the time, Burton Rissman
Black-Scholes was what really enabled the exchange to thrive . . . we were faced in
the late 60s – early 70s with the issue of gambling. That fell away, and I think
Black-Scholes made it fall away. It wasn’t speculation or gambling it was efficient
pricing. [MacKenzie, 2008, p 158]
Essentially a mathematical formula transformed index options from being illegitimate gambles
to deterministic investments.
Both the Black-Scholes and Merton approaches to pricing options involved heuristic argu-
ments, they were ‘engineering solutions’. Harrison sought to establish a rigorous option pricing
‘theory’ to support the range of mathematical models developed on the back of the explosion
in derivatives markets [MacKenzie, 2008, pp 140–141]. Harrison, and his colleagues, were
successful in their mission and opened finance to investigation by pure mathematicians, such
as [Schachermayer, 1984], [Delbaen and Schachermayer, 1994], [Delbaen and Schachermayer,
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1998], and by 2000, any mathematician working on asset pricing would do so within the context
of the FTAP.
The FTAP is not well known outside the academic field of financial mathematics. Prac-
titioners focus on the models that are a consequence of the Theorem while social scientists
focus on the original Black-Scholes-Merton approach as an exemplar. Even before the market
crash of 1987 practitioners were sceptical as to the validity of the prices produced by their
models ([Miyazaki, 2007, pp 409-410 ], [MacKenzie, 2008, p 248], [Haugh and Taleb, 2011])
and today the original Black–Scholes equation is used to measure market volatility, a proxy
for uncertainty, rather than to ‘price’ options.
However, the status of the Black-Scholes model as an exemplar in financial economics
has been enhanced following the development of the FTAP. Significantly, the theorem unifies
different approaches in financial economics. The most immediate example of this synthesis was
that in the course of the development of the FTAP it was observed that a mathematical object,
the Radon-Nikodym derivative, which is related to the stochastic calculus Merton employed
involved the market-price of risk (Sharpe ratio), a key object in CAPM that Black used.
Without the FTAP the two approaches are incongruous [MacKenzie, 2003, p 834]. Overall,
as will be discussed in full in the next section, the FTAP brings together: Merton’s approach
employing stochastic calculus advocated by Samuelson; CAPM, developed by Treynor and
Sharpe; martingales, a mathematical concept employed by Fama in the development of the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis; and the idea of incomplete markets, introduced by Arrow and
Debreu.
The synthesis by the FTAP of a ‘constellation of beliefs, values, techniques’ represented
a Kuhnian paradigm for financial economics focused on the Black-Scholes-Merton approach
to pricing options. The paradigm was further strengthen by the fact that the unification was
presented as emerging out of pure mathematics and appeals to Realists who believe in the
transcendence of mathematics and the existence of an Idealised economic universe.
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4.2 An Ethical Analysis of the FTAP
The FTAP is a theorem of mathematics, and the use of the term ‘measure’ in its statement
places the FTAP within the theory of probability formulated by Andrei Kolmogorov in 1933
[Kolmogorov, 1933 (1956)]. Kolmogorov’s work took place in a context captured by Bertrand
Russell, who in 1927 observed that
It is important to realise the fundamental position of probability in science. . . . As
to what is meant by probability, opinions differ. [Russell, 1927 (2009), p 301]
In the 1920s the idea of randomness, as distinct from a lack of information, was becoming
substantive in the physical sciences [von Plato, 1994, pp 147–157] because of the emergence of
the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics. In the social sciences, Frank Knight
argued that uncertainty was the only source of profit [Knight, 1921 (2006), III.VII.1–4] and
the concept was pervading John Maynard Keynes’ economics (Mizuhara and Runde [2004],
[Skidelsky, 2009, pp 84–88]).
Two mathematical theories of probability had become ascendant by the late 1920s. Richard
von Mises (brother of the Austrian economist Ludwig) [von Mises, 1957 (1982)] attempted to
lay down the axioms of classical probability within a framework of Empiricism, the ‘frequentist’
or ‘objective’ approach. To counter–balance von Mises, the Italian actuary Bruno de Finetti
presented a more Pragmatic approach, characterised by his claim that “Probability does not
exist” because it was only an expression of the observer’s view of the world. This ‘subjectivist’
approach was closely related to the less well-known position taken by the Pragmatist Frank
Ramsey who developed an argument against Keynes’ Realist interpretation of probability
presented in the Treatise on Probability (Ramsey [1931], Ramsey and Mellor [1980], Davis
[2004], Edgington [2012]).
Kolmogorov addressed the trichotomy of mathematical probability by generalising so that
Realist, Empiricist and Pragmatist probabilities were all examples of ‘measures’ satisfying
33
certain axioms. In doing this, a random variable became a function while an expectation was
an integral: probability became a branch of Analysis, not Statistics.
Von Mises criticised Kolmogorov’s generalised framework as un-necessarily complex [von Mises,
1957 (1982), p 99] while the statistician Maurice Kendall argued that abstract measure the-
ory failed “to found a theory of probability as a branch of scientific method” [Kendall, 1949,
p 102]. More recently the physicist Edwin Jaynes champions Leonard Savage’s subjectivist
Bayesianism as having a “deeper conceptual foundation which allows it to be extended to a
wider class of applications, required by current problems of science” [Jaynes, 2003, p 655].
The objections to measure theoretic probability for empirical scientists can be accounted
for as a lack of physicality. Frequentist probability is based on the act of counting; sub-
jectivist probability is based on a flow of information, which, following Claude Shannon, is
now an observable entity in Empirical science. Measure theoretic probability is based on
abstract mathematical objects unrelated to sensible phenomena. However, the generality of
Kolmogorov’s approach made it flexible enough to handle problems that emerged in physics
and engineering during the Second World War and his approach became widely accepted after
1950 because it was practically more useful.
In the context of the first statement of the FTAP, a ‘martingale measure’ is a probability
measure, usually labelled Q, such that the (real, rather than nominal) price of an asset today,
X0, is the expectation, using the martingale measure, of its (real) price in the future, XT .
Formally,
X0 = EQ
[
XT
]
.
The abstract probability distribution Q is defined so that this equality exists, not on any
empirical information of historical prices or subjective judgement of future prices. The only
condition placed on the relationship that the martingale measure has with the ‘natural’, or
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‘physical’, probability measures usually assigned the label P, is that they agree on what is
possible.
The term ‘martingale’ in this context derives from doubling strategies in gambling and
it was introduced into mathematics by Jean Ville in a development of von Mises work of
1939. The idea that asset prices have the martingale property was first proposed by Benoit
Mandelbrot [Mandelbrot, 1966] in response to an early formulation of Eugene Fama’s Efficient
Market Hypothesis (EMH) [Fama, 1965], the two concepts being combined by Fama in 1970
[Fama, 1970]. For Mandelbrot and Fama the key consequence of prices being martingales
was that the current price was independent of the future price and technical analysis would
not prove profitable in the long run. In developing the EMH there was no discussion on the
nature of the probability under which assets are martingales, and it is often assumed that
the expectation is calculated under the natural measure. While the FTAP employs modern
terminology in the context of value-neutrality, the idea of equating a current price with a
future, uncertain, payoff would have been understood by Olivi and obvious to Huygens, both
working in an explicitly ethical framework.
The other technical term in the first statement of the FTAP, arbitrage, has long been
used in financial mathematics. In Chapter 9 of the Liber Abaci Fibonacci discusses ‘Barter of
Merchandise and Similar Things’,
20 arms of cloth are worth 3 Pisan pounds and 42 rolls of cotton are similarly
worth 5 Pisan pounds; it is sought how many rolls of cotton will be had for 50
arms of cloth. [Sigler, 2002, p 180]
In this case there are three commodities, arms of cloth, rolls of cotton and Pisan pounds, and
Fibonacci solves the problem by having Pisan pounds ‘arbitrate’, or ‘mediate’ as Aristotle
might say, between the other two commodities. Over the centuries this technique of pricing
through arbitration evolved into the Law of One Price: if two assets offer identical cash flows
then they must have the same price. This was employed by Jan de Witt in 1671 when he
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solved the problem of pricing life annuities in terms of redeemable annuities, based on the
presumption that
the real value of certain expectations or chances of objects, of different value, should
be estimated by that which we can obtain from as many expectations or chances
dependent on one or several equitable contracts. [Sylla, 2003, p 313, quoting De
Witt]
In 1908 Vincent Bronzin published a text which discusses pricing derivatives by ‘covering’,
or hedging, them with portfolios of options and forward contracts employing the principle of
‘equivalence’ [Zimmermann and Hafner, 2007]. In 1965 the mathematicians, Edward Thorp
and Sheen Kassouf, combined the Law of One Price with basic techniques of calculus to
identify market mis-pricing of warrant prices and in 1967 they published their methodology
in a best-selling book, Beat the Market.
Within neo-classical economics, the Law of One Price was developed in a series of papers
between 1954 and 1964 by Kenneth Arrow, Ge´rard Debreu and Lionel MacKenzie in the
context of general equilibrium, in particular the introduction of the Arrow Security, which,
employing the Law of One Price, could be used to price any asset [Arrow, 1964]. It was on
this principle that Black and Scholes believed the value of the warrants could be deduced by
employing a hedging portfolio, in introducing their work with the statement that “it should not
be possible to make sure profits” [Black and Scholes, 1973] they were invoking the arbitrage
argument, which had an eight hundred year history.
In the context of the FTAP, ‘an arbitrage’ has developed into the ability to formulate a
trading strategy such that the probability, under a natural or martingale measure, of a loss
is zero, but the probability of a positive profit is not. This definition is important following
Hardie’s criticism of the way the term is applied loosely in economic sociology, and elsewhere
[Hardie, 2004]. The important point of this definition is that, unlike Hardie’s definition [Hardie,
2004, p 243], there is no guaranteed (strictly positive) profit.
36
To understand the connection between the financial concept of arbitrage and the math-
ematical idea of a martingale measure, consider the most basic case of a single asset whose
current price, X0, can take on one of two (present) values, X
D
T
< XU
T
, at time T > 0, in the
future. In this case an arbitrage would exist if X0 ≤ X
D
T
< XU
T
: buying the asset now, at a
price that is less than or equal to the future pay-offs, would lead to a possible profit at the end
of the period, with the guarantee of no loss. Similarly, if XD
T
< XU
T
≤ X0, short selling the
asset now, and buying it back would also lead to an arbitrage. So, for there to be no arbitrage
opportunities we require that
XD
T
< X0 < X
U
T
.
This implies that there is a number, 0 < q < 1, such that
X0 = X
D
T
+ q (XU
T
−XD
T
)
= q XU
T
+ (1− q)XD
T
.
The price now, X0, lies between the future prices, X
U
T
and XD
T
, in the ratio q : (1 − q) and
represents some sort of ‘average’. The first statement of the FTAP can be interpreted simply
as “the price of an asset must lie between its maximum and minimum possible (real) future
price”.
If X0 < X
D
T
≤ XU
T
we have that q < 0 where as if XD
T
≤ XU
T
< X0 then q > 1, and in
both cases q does not represent a probability measure which by Kolmogorov’s axioms, must lie
between 0 and 1. In either of these cases an arbitrage exists and a trader can make a riskless
profit, the market involves ‘turpe lucrum’. This account gives an insight as to why James
Bernoulli, in his moral approach to probability, considered situations where probabilities did
not sum to 1, he was considering problems that were pathological not because they failed the
rules of arithmetic but because they were unfair.
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It follows that if there are no arbitrage opportunities then quantity q can be seen as
representing the ‘probability’ that the XU
T
price will materialise in the future. Formally
X0 = q X
U
T
+ (1− q)XD
T
≡ EQ
[
XT
]
.
The connection between the financial concept of arbitrage and the mathematical object of a
martingale is essentially a tautology: both statements mean that the price today of an asset
must lie between its future minimum and maximum possible value.
This first statement of the FTAP was anticipated by Ramsey in 1926 when he defined
‘probability’ in the Pragmatic sense of ‘a degree of belief’ and argues that measuring ‘degrees
of belief’ is through betting odds [Ramsey, 1931, p 171]. On this basis he formulates some
axioms of probability, including that a probability must lie between 0 and 1 [Ramsey, 1931, p
181]. He then goes on to say that
These are the laws of probability, . . . If anyone’s mental condition violated these
laws, his choice would depend on the precise form in which the options were offered
him, which would be absurd. He could have a book made against him by a cunning
better and would then stand to lose in any event. [Ramsey, 1931, p 182]
This is a Pragmatic argument that identifies the absence of the martingale measure with
the existence of arbitrage and today this forms the basis of the standard argument as to
why arbitrages do not exist: if they did the, other market participants would bankrupt the
agent who was mis-pricing the asset. This has become known in philosophy as the ‘Dutch
Book’ argument and as a consequence of the fact/value dichotomy this is often presented as
a ‘matter of fact’. However, ignoring the fact/value dichotomy, the Dutch book argument is
an alternative of the ‘Golden Rule’– “Do to others as you would have them do to you.”– it is
infused with the moral concepts of fairness and reciprocity (Wattles [1996], Ha´jek [2008]).
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The essential result of this paper is that embedded at the heart of the first statement of the
FTAP is the ethical concept Justice, capturing the social norms of reciprocity and fairness.
This is significant in the context of Granovetter’s discussion of embeddedness in economics
[Granovetter, 1985]. It is conventional to assume that mainstream economic theory is ‘un-
dersocialised’: agents are rational calculators seeking to maximise an objective function. The
argument presented here is that a central theorem in contemporary economics, the FTAP, is
deeply embedded in social norms, despite being presented as an undersocialised mathematical
object. This embeddedness is a consequence of the origins of mathematical probability being
in the ethical analysis of commercial contracts: the feudal shackles are still binding this most
modern of economic theories.
Ramsey goes on to make an important point
Having any definite degree of belief implies a certain measure of consistency, namely
willingness to bet on a given proposition at the same odds for any stake, the stakes
being measured in terms of ultimate values. Having degrees of belief obeying
the laws of probability implies a further measure of consistency, namely such a
consistency between the odds acceptable on different propositions as shall prevent
a book being made against you. [Ramsey, 1931, p 182–183]
Ramsey is arguing that an agent needs to employ the same measure in pricing all assets in a
market, and this is the key result in contemporary derivative pricing. Having identified the
martingale measure on the basis of a ‘primal’ asset, it is then applied across the market, in
particular to derivatives on the primal asset but the well-known result that if two assets offer
different ‘market prices of risk’, an arbitrage exists. This explains why the market-price of risk
appears in the Radon-Nikodym derivative and the Capital Market Line, it enforces Ramsey’s
consistency in pricing.
The second statement of the FTAP is concerned with incomplete markets, which appear in
relation to Arrow-Debreu prices. In mathematics, in the special case that there are as many,
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or more, assets in a market as there are possible future, uncertain, states, a unique pricing
vector can be deduced for the market because of Cramer’s Rule. If the elements of the pricing
vector satisfy the axioms of probability, specifically each element is positive and they all sum
to one, then the market precludes arbitrage opportunities. This is the case covered by the
first statement of the FTAP.
In the more realistic situation that there are more possible future states than assets, the
market can still be arbitrage free but the pricing vector, the martingale measure, might not
be unique. The agent can still be consistent in selecting which particular martingale measure
they choose to use, but another agent might choose a different measure, such that the two do
not agree on a price. In the context of the Law of One Price, this means that we cannot hedge,
replicate or cover, a position in the market, such that the portfolio is riskless. The significance
of the second statement of the FTAP is that it tells us that in the sensible world of imperfect
knowledge and transaction costs, a model within the framework of the FTAP cannot give
a precise price. When faced with incompleteness in markets, agents need alternative ways
to price assets and behavioural techniques have come to dominate financial theory. This
feature was realised in The Port Royal Logic when it recognised the role of transaction costs
in lotteries.
40
5 Two Women and a Duck – a Pragmatic approach to
commerce
We present the case that the essence of the FTAP is reciprocity, alternatively Justice and
equality in exchange, colloquially fairness. The pre-history of mathematical probability lies in
Olivi’s examination of commercial exchange in the context of Aristotle’s Ethics. The subse-
quent emergence of the topic is in the seventeenth century analysis of contracts in the context
of ‘fair’ pricing. In the twentieth century Ramsey provides the ‘Dutch book’ argument, which
can be viewed as the ‘Golden Rule’ of reciprocity. However, under the influence of a strong
fact/value dichotomy that was established in the nineteenth century, the moral injunction not
to engage in turpe lucrum, through the practice of arbitrage, becomes highly technical, and
ethically neutral, and in the process the essence of reciprocity in the FTAP becomes obscured.
This argument associates the FTAP with the experimental results of the ‘Ultimatum
Game’, an important anomaly for neo-classical economics [Thaler, 1988]. The game involves
two participants and a sum of money. The first player proposes how to share the money with
the second participant. The division is made only if the second participant accepts the split,
if the first player’s proposal is rejected neither participant receives anything. The key result
is that if the money is not split ‘fairly’ (approximately equally) then the second player rejects
the offer. This contradicts the assumption that people are rational utility maximising agents,
since if they were the second player would accept any positive payment. Research has shown
that chimpanzees are rational maximisers while the willingness of the second player to accept
an offer is dependent on age and culture. Older people from societies where exchange plays a
significant role are more likely to demand a fairer split of the pot than young children or adults
from isolated communities (Murnighan and Saxon [1998], Henrich et al. [2004], Henrich et al.
[2006], Jensen et al. [2007]). Fair exchange appears to be learnt behaviour developed in a
social context and is fundamental to human society and distinguishes the sapient member of
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a civitas from the sentient animals. The Ultimatum Game provides observational evidence
that reciprocity is, or at least should be, a fundamental concept for financial economics.
We have shown the key role that the FTAP plays in the dominant paradigm of financial
economics, involving CAPM (Markowitz portfolio selection), the Efficient Markets Hypothesis
(martingales), the use of stochastic calculus and incomplete markets. At first sight one might
assume that this paradigm associated with utility maximisation, but on closer reflection the
key components are not.
Markowitz portfolio theory explicitly observes that portfolio managers are not (expected)
utility maximisers, as they diversify, and offers the hypothesis that a desire for reward is tem-
pered by a fear of uncertainty (Markowitz [1952], see also [Roy, 1952, p 432]). Markowitz’s
theory was developed into the CAPM by Sharpe while similar models were developed inde-
pendently by Treynor, Lintner and Mossin. These models conclude that all investors should
hold the same portfolio, their individual risk-reward objectives are satisfied by the weighting
of this ‘index portfolio’ in comparison to riskless cash in the bank, a point on the capital mar-
ket line. The slope of the CML is the market price of risk, which is an important parameter
in arbitrage arguments. Significantly, as MacKenzie [MacKenzie, 2008, pp 86–87] observes,
Markowitz portfolio selection and CAPM are prescriptive, not descriptive theories; just as me-
dieval merchants were told what was licit by the Scholastics, so, in the 1980s, asset managers
were being told what is ‘rational’ by academics.
Merton had initially attempted to provide an alternative to Markowitz based on utility
maximisation employing stochastic calculus. He was only able to resolve the problem by
employing the hedging arguments of Black and Scholes, and in doing so built a model that
was based on the absence of arbitrage, free of turpe-lucrum. The opening paragraph of Black
and Scholes includes the prescriptive statement that “it should not be possible to make sure
profits”, a statement explicit in the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and in employing an Arrow
security in the context of the Law of One Price.
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Based on these observations, we conject that the whole paradigm for financial economics,
not just the FTAP, is built on the principle of balanced reciprocity. In order to explore this
conjecture we shall examine the relationship between commerce and themes in Pragmatic
philosophy. Specifically, we highlight Robert Brandom’s position that there is
a pragmatist conception of norms – a notion of primitive correctnesses of perfor-
mance implicit in practice that precludes and are presupposed by their explicit
formulation in rules and principles. [Brandom, 1994, p 21]
The argument that we have presented is that reciprocity is implicit in the practice of commerce
(e.g. Humphrey [1985]) and this norm becomes explicit in Virtue Ethics and then in the early
conceptions of mathematical probability.
The ‘primitive correctnesses’ of commercial practices was recognised by Aristotle when he
investigated the nature of Justice in the context of commerce and then by Olivi when he looked
favourably on merchants. It is exhibited in the doux-commerce thesis, compare Fourcade and
Healey’s contemporary description of the thesis
Commerce teaches ethics mainly through its communicative dimension, that is, by
promoting conversations among equals and exchange between strangers. [Fourcade and Healy,
2007, p 287]
with Putnam’s description of Habermas’ communicative action based on
the norm of sincerity, the norm of truth-telling, and the norm of asserting only
what is rationally warranted . . . [and] is contrasted with manipulation. [Putnam,
2002, pp 113-114]
There are practices (that should be) implicit in commerce that make it an exemplar of com-
municative action.
A further expression of markets as centres of communication is manifested in the Asian
description of a market as “Two women and a duck”, which immediately brings to mind
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Donald Davidson’s argument that knowledge is not the product of a bipartite conversations
but a tripartite relationship between two speakers and their shared environment (e.g. Davidson
[2001]). The essence of the proverb is that if two women, who are characterised as talkative,
and a duck come together, eventually the value of the duck will be determined–knowledge is
created. Replacing the negotiation between market agents with an algorithm that delivers a
theoretical price replaces ‘knowledge’, generated through communication, with dogma. The
problem with the performativity that Donald MacKenzie is concerned with [MacKenzie, 2008]
is one of monism. In employing pricing algorithms, the markets cannot perform to something
that comes close to ‘true belief’, which can only be identified through communication between
sapient humans. This is an almost trivial observation to (successful) market participants
(e.g. Tett [2009], Beunza and Stark [2012], [Duhon, 2012, especially Ch 12]), but difficult to
appreciate by spectators who seek to attain ‘objective’ knowledge of markets from a distance.
To appreciate the relevance to financial crises of the position that ‘true belief’ is about
establishing coherence through myriad triangulations centred on an asset rather than relying
on a theoretical model, consider the comment made by Parliamentary Commission on Banking
Standards
Excessive complexity in the major banks is not restricted to organisational struc-
ture. The fuelling of the financial crisis by misguided risk models was not simply
the consequence of some mathematicians getting their equations wrong. It was the
result of ignorance, coupled with excessive faith in the application of mathematical
precision, by senior management and by regulators. Many of the elements of this
problem remain. [PCBS, 2013, para. 93, v. II]
Mathematicians understood the limitations of their models, which they communicated. The
problem was that these concerns were not appreciated by policy makers, within an institu-
tion, nationally or globally, who appear to have succumbed to the indubitable authority of
mathematics [PCBS, 2013, para. 60–61, v. II]. Stephen Krasner observes [McMurtrie, 2013]
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that academics can help policy makers in two respects: “Provide empirical evidence about
what has happened, and offer a conceptual framework through which to understand it.” A
significant issue with the highly technical mathematical models employed in finance is that
they lack a “conceptual framework” that non-specialists can understand. This means that
policy makers, whether within or without banks, cannot ascertain the limitations of math-
ematical models that inform their decision making. Pragmatism provides the philosophical
basis for a conceptual framework that acknowledges both the usefulness and the fallibility of
mathematics in finance.
The significance of these issues to the FTAP is captured in a text by Rama Cont and Peter
Tankov addressing pricing in markets with discontinuous prices
Unless the martingale measure is a by-product of a hedging approach, the price
given by such martingale measures is not related to the cost of a hedging strategy
therefore the meaning of such ‘prices’ is not clear. [Cont and Tankov, 2004, 10.5.2]
If the hedging argument cannot be employed, as in the markets studied by Cont and Tankov,
there is no conceptual framework supporting the prices obtained from the FTAP. This lack of
meaning can be interpreted as a consequence of the strict fact/value dichotomy in contempo-
rary mathematics that came with the eclipse of Poincare´’s Intuitionism by Hilbert’s Formalism
and Bourbaki’s Rationalism [Weintraub, 2002]. The practical problem of supporting the social
norms of market exchange has been replaced by a theoretical problem of developing formal
models of markets. These models then legitimate the actions of agents in the market without
having to make reference to explicitly normative values.
In making this observation and by considering the implications of believing that the FTAP
is an expression of reciprocity, we are employing the ‘Pragmatic maxim’ and are making a
commitment to real-life experiences. Another, more direct, consequence of associating the
FTAP with reciprocity is related to the EMH. Miyazaki observes [Miyazaki, 2007, p 404] that
speculation by arbitrageurs has been legitimised as ensuring that markets are efficient. The
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EMH is based on the axiom that the market price is determined by the balance between
supply and demand, and so an increase in trading facilitates the convergence to equilibrium.
If this axiom is replaced by the axiom of reciprocity, the justification for speculative activity in
support of efficient markets disappears. In fact, the axiom of reciprocity would de-legitimise
‘true’ arbitrage opportunities, as being unfair. This would not necessarily make the activities
of actual market arbitrageurs illicit, since there are rarely strategies that are without the risk
of a loss, however, it would place more emphasis on the risks of speculation and inhibit the
hubris that has been associated with the prelude to the recent Crisis.
These points raise the question of the legitimacy of speculation in the markets. In an at-
tempt to understand this issue Gabrielle and Reuven Brenner identify the three types of market
participant. ‘Investors’ are preoccupied with future scarcity and so defer income. Because un-
certainty exposes the investor to the risk of loss, investors wish to minimise uncertainty at the
cost of potential profits, this is the basis of classical investment theory. ‘Gamblers’ will bet on
an outcome taking odds that have been agreed on by society, such as with a sporting bet or in
a casino, and relates to de Moivre’s and Montmort’s ‘taming of chance’. ‘Speculators’ bet on a
mis-calculation of the odds quoted by society and the reason why speculators are regarded as
socially questionable is that they have opinions that are explicitly at odds with the consensus:
they are practitioners who rebel against a theoretical ‘Truth’ ([Brenner and Brenner, 1990, p
91], [Beunza and Stark, 2012, p 394]). This is captured in Arjun Appadurai’s argument that
the leading agents in modern finance
believe in their capacity to channel the workings of chance to win in the games
dominated by cultures of control . . . [they] are not those who wish to “tame chance”
but those who wish to use chance to animate the otherwise deterministic play of
risk [quantifiable uncertainty]”. [Appadurai, 2011, p 533-534]
In the context of Pragmatism, financial speculators embody pluralism, a concept essential
to Pragmatic thinking (e.g. Price [1992], Bernstein [1992], [Bernstein, 2013, Ch 2]) and an
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antidote to the problem of radical uncertainty.
Appadurai was motivated to study finance by Marcel Mauss’ essay Le Don (‘The Gift’),
exploring the moral force behind reciprocity in primitive and archaic societies and goes on
to say that the contemporary financial speculator is “betting on the obligation of return”
[Appadurai, 2011, p 535], and this is the fundamental axiom of contemporary finance. David
Graeber also recognises the fundamental position reciprocity has in finance [Graeber, 2011],
but where as Appadurai recognises the importance of reciprocity in the presence of uncertainty,
Graeber essentially ignores uncertainty in his analysis that ends with the conclusion that “we
don’t ‘all’ have to pay our debts” [Graeber, 2011, p 391]. In advocating that reciprocity
need not be honoured, Graeber is not just challenging contemporary capitalism but also the
foundations of the civitas, based on equality and reciprocity [Graafland, 2010, p 235].
The origins of Graeber’s argument are in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1836
John Stuart Mill defined political economy as being
concerned with [man] solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is
capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.
[Mill, 1967]
In Principles of Political Economy of 1848 Mill defended Thomas Malthus’ An Essay on
the Principle of Population, which focused on scarcity. Mill was writing at a time when
Europe was struck by the Cholera pandemic of 1829–1851 and the famines of 1845–1851
and while Lord Tennyson was describing nature as “red in tooth and claw”. At this time,
society’s fear of uncertainty seems to have been replaced by a fear of scarcity (e.g. James
[1896 (2009)]), and these standards of objectivity dominated economic thought through the
twentieth century. Almost a hundred years after Mill, Lionel Robbins defined economics as
“the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means
which have alternative uses”.
Dichotomies emerge in the aftermath of the Cartesian revolution that aims to remove
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doubt from philosophy [Bernstein, 2013, Ch 1]. Theory and practice, subject and object, facts
and values, means and ends are all separated. In this environment ex cathedra norms, in
particular utility (profit) maximisation, encroach on commercial practice. This is exemplified
by the 1950 English court case Buttle v. Sunders ([1950] 2 All ER 193) where it was judged
that ‘my word is my bond’ was subordinate to the profit maximisation principle.
In order to set boundaries on commercial behaviour motivated by profit maximisation,
particularly when market uncertainty returned after the Nixon shock of 1971, society imposes
regulations on practice. As a consequence, two competing ethics, functional Consequential
ethics guiding market practices and regulatory Deontological ethics attempting stabilise the
system, vie for supremacy. It is in this debilitating competition between two essentially theo-
retical ethical frameworks that we offer an explanation for the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009:
profit maximisation, not speculation, is destabilising in the presence of radical uncertainty
and regulation cannot keep up with motivated profit maximisers who can justify their actions
through abstract mathematical models that bare little resemblance to actual markets.
This tension is exemplified by the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute Standards
of Practice Handbook [CFA Institute Standards of Practice Council, 2010], where the primary
obligation is to obey the law, where Buttle v Saunders is tempered by the Basel treaties.
There is no discussion of how professionals should interact amongst themselves, only how they
interact with clients and employers, agents with whom they have a contractual relationship.
This suggests that a distinction is being made between the market, populated by analysts,
and society as a whole.
An implication of reorienting financial economics to focus on the markets as centres of
‘communicative action’ is that markets could become self-regulating, in the same way that
the legal or medical spheres are self-regulated through professions. This is not a ‘libertarian’
argument based on freeing the Consequential ethic from a Deontological brake. Rather it
argues that being a market participant entails restricting norms on the agent such as sincerity
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and truth telling that support knowledge creation, of asset prices, within a broader objective
of social cohesion. This immediately calls into question the legitimacy of algorithmic/high-
frequency trading that seems an anathema in regard to the principles of communicative action.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to explore the ethical character of contemporary financial eco-
nomics in light of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008.
By examining the contemporary scholarship on the early development of probability we
show that the field emerged in the seventeenth century out of the ethical assessment of com-
mercial contracts. In the following century, the doux-commerce thesis dominated discussion
of the morality of markets, emphasising the role markets play in binding society. The ethical
aspect of probability theory disappears from mathematics at the start of the nineteenth cen-
tury as science replaces uncertainty with Laplacian determinism [Gigerenzer, 1989] and the
self-destructive thesis eclipses doux-commerce. Economics developed on Mill’s premise that
the discipline is “concerned with [man] solely as a being who desires to possess wealth” and
‘value–neutrality’ emerges, built on the foundation scientific determinism. It was within this
conceptual framework that the Black-Scholes equation was developed.
When a mathematical ‘theory’ to underpin the Black-Scholes-Merton approach, the Funda-
mental Theorem of Asset Pricing, is developed it relies on Kolmogorov’s abstract probabilities.
The essence of this paper is in identifying these ‘martingale measures’ with probabilities that
ensure equality in exchange, implicitly imitating the explicitly ethical approach of the early
probabilists. This observation is significant in that it provides evidence of ‘oversocialisation’
in a domain traditionally considered ‘undersocialised’.
The argument presented in the paper is based on employing the Pragmatic approach
that acknowledges the contingency of knowledge. By taking this path we argue that markets
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should be regarded as centres of ‘communicative action’ governed by Pragmatic norms and that
recent financial crises have been as a consequence of a dissonance between market participants
working to Consequentialist norms but constrained by Deontological norms. In taking this
approach we see a correspondence with Brandom’s semantic pragmatism, firstly because we see
the implicit norm of reciprocity being made explicit in probability, and secondly because there
is a correspondence between the results of the Ultimatum game, which show humans prefer
reciprocity to utility maximisation and animals do not, and Brandom’s distinction between
animal sentinence and human sapience. This, in turn, offers a solution to the problems of
financial regulation.
An obvious sequel to this paper its to undertake a more detailed and structured inves-
tigation into the relationship between commerce and Pragmatism. This could explore how
Pragmatism can inform mathematical developments (such as in Henderson and Hobson [2007],
Musiela and Zariphopoulou [2009], which address means-ends dichotomies, or Brown and Rogers
[2012], Cont and Wagalath [2013], which address monism/pluralism issues) and how financial
intuition can support Pragmatic theories. In particular, a significant topic in Behavioural Fi-
nance is Prospect Theory and the transformation of objective probabilities in decision making.
These probability transformations are presented as ‘irrational’ in the context of Empiricism
and Realism but they could be re-interpreted as ‘warranted’ in a Pragmatic framework. Po-
tentially, neo-classical and behavioural financial economics could be unified on the basis of
reciprocity.
Recent models analysing whether the proliferation of financial instruments leads to insta-
bility (e.g. Caccioli et al. [2009] – which is influential on the widely cited Haldane and May
[2011], Simsek [2013]) are based on the assumption that agents are seeking to maximise utility,
rather than acting in a framework of balanced reciprocity. An interesting research question
would be to investigate what types of financial networks emerge on the basis of either profit
maximisation or reciprocity, and then analyse if different network topologies are more resilient
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to financial shocks.
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